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„ , five years or so, studies of aggregate returns andOver the past five years
capital gains in facing and, at the ^ - e c o n o m i c  level, cortisone 
of trends in farmland rents and prices, have helped to clear up *uch of
the mystery that characterised earlier discussions of farm land prices. 
Changes in farm asset values were shown to have paralleled srmxlar 
changes in income produced hy those assets. The long-term uptrend an
• „  bv logically fostering expectations of continued incomeasset earnings, by logicaxij
, . q1i at. a relatively low current yield— agains, had led farmland to sell at a relativ y
• f nt with basic theory of asset pricing. After describing result consistent witti Dasiu u j
, . . 1979 p noted their "serious implications...for
these relationships m  19/y,
public farm policy." For example, "Policy actions that increase the 
growth rate [of income] will tend to depress the rate of current return
to assets, and thus the problems they seek to address are eventually
aggravated."
Although some financial analysts among agricultural economists
have been discussing these income-wealth relationships for several
years, their devastating implications for many popular views of farm 
profitability and farm policy are still not widely appreciated. The 
media, policymakers, and many economists frequently exhibit faulty
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impressions and Interpretations of key ^  ^
Perhaps they and the public have been Poorly served by the specialists
“  agrlCUltUral I* - T  *  time to address more explicitly the
policy implications that flow from financial considerations. In this 
spirit, I will explore the following theses:
0 )  through ^ capitalization fa™  -eaXth was created
induced by government programs! " 88 gr°Wth that was> ln Part,
boom"le!el of^arniMS * U “ 1 was created when a
multiple of those earnings,"indicting that felatlvely hlSh 
further earnings growth. S hat farmers expected
(3) Preservation of the new wpaH-fc -
growth, which owners of farms w l l T ^ 8 COntinued eatnings
greater sales, higher prices ^  t0 SeCUre throuSh’ siier prices, or government assistance.
(4) If farm supply-demand relationships are such that th« ■ j
earnings growth is not produced it - U the requlred interpsi- fn iioi *. * tis not in the public
government programs" ^ h T Y Y u p "  I ^ Y h o ^ a l T i Y e Y n L g Y "811
r^ iuiivt; Uir1 ASSETS
Before considering how public policy is involved with farm wealth,
one should know how wealth is created. To introduce this subject I
will draw briefly on my earlier papers. Xn 1978, , polnted out ^
the earnings that USDA bad estimated to be attributabie to farm assets 
had risen just as much as land prices over the previous 25 years. Thus 
much of the increase in asset values since the mid-1950s could be
explained by the proportional rise in earnings. And, both earnings and
land prices— rather than only the latfpr-K^
7 matter— had risen considerably faster
than the rate of general price inflation.
A year later, I pointed out that the price of an asset with a 
long-term earnings growth record such as that exhibited by farm real
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estate should certainly reflect expectations that earnings growth will 
continue; that is, the growth model of asset pricing should apply.*
Almost certainly, expectations of future earnings growth— which would 
be accompanied by proportional increases in asset prices— were an 
integral element in the pricing of farm land over recent decades. The 
arithmetic of the pricing of an asset with growing earnings is such 
that the asset sells at a relatively high multiple of the current level 
of earnings; or, stated inversely, that it sells to yield a relatively 
low rate of income return. Therefore— and though this seems astonishing 
at first encounter, it is perfectly logical— a primary reason for the 
relatively low rate of income return that has characterized farm assets 
since the mid-1950s is the relatively high longer-term growth posted 
by that income.
The arithmetic of the growth model of asset pricing is quite simple, 
because the rate of income growth and the rate of income return are 
additive and must sum to the total rate of return required by investors. 2 
For example, if investors require a total return of 5 percent, an asset 
producing a stable income will be priced to yield an income return of 
5 percent; that is, it will sell at 20 times earnings. But if, instead, 
the real earnings of the asset are rising by 3 percent annually— which 
means that its real price will also tend to be rising by 3 percent 
annually— then investors, in seeking the same total return of 5 percent,
J7 James C. VanHorne, Financial Management and Policy, Sixth Edition, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983, pp. 27-29.
2/ What determines the required total rate of return— the total rate 
of return that investors seek from farm land? That rate of return is 
set by the participants in the land market— by farmers and other buyers 
and sellers of land. They will set it as their bids and offers reflect 
their knowledge of the rates of return available on alternative assets, 
adjusted for differences in risk.
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will price the asset to yield an income return of only 2 percent; that 
is, the asset will sell at 50 times earnings. The expected total rate 
of return will still be 5 percent— 2 percent in the form of current 
income and 3 percent in the form of real capital appreciation.
This example also serves to provide a sense of the enormous power 
of wealth creation or destruction inherent in assets that are producing 
growing earnings. When an asset first moves, in the eyes of asset 
market participants, from stable to growing real earnings, the increase 
in its price-earnings multiple can produce relatively enormous windfall 
real capital gains for those who own it when that happens. Furthermore, 
if real earnings should take an unexpected quantum jump after the asset 
is already priced at a high multiple of earlier earnings, and the new 
level of earnings is capitalized at the same high multiple, then 
relatively enormous capital gains again occur (this is roughly what 
happened in farm land pricing during the 1970s).
Unfortunately for its owners, these two processes are just as 
powerful when they operate in reverse, producing relatively enormous 
real capital losses when real earnings stop growing or decline. 
Furthermore, economic history indicates that this event is inevitable—  
only its timing is uncertain. Even in the relatively short history of 
the United States, farm assets have repeatedly produced lengthy upward 
trends in earnings— some measured in decades— that were each reversed 
at a time that few owners foresaw.
Thus, when an asset is priced as a growth stock it can usefully be 
regarded as a monster that demands continual real earnings growth. This 
analogy should serve to remind its owners of the need to stay alert. As 
long as earnings grow in accordance with the expectations that underlie
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its price-earnings multiple, the monster favors its owners with 
compounded accumulation of real capital gains. But growth in earn g 
never continues forever— it always stops well before one owns the 
entire world.3 If the monster is not fed its expected income growth, 
it soon turns on its owners. As the earnings-growth component is 
excised from asset value, recent or heavily indebted purchasers of the 
monster usually experience financial trauma.
GROWTH OF FARM INCOME AND WEALTH
Over the last three decades, aggregate earnings attributable to 
farm assets rose by about the same percentage as the average price of 
farm real estate. But for much of this time, many analysts were unaware 
of this relationship. Instead, beginning in the 1950s, their attention 
was focused on the relatively low level to which the rate of income 
return to assets had fallen. Twenty-five years later, in the late 1970s 
the rate of income return was again at about the same level. But this 
means, of course, that the numerator of the ratio-income from assets- 
had risen just as much as the denominator— farm asset values that were
dominated by land prices.
Such similarity in the upward trends of income from assets and of 
land prices was observed not only by analysts who studied the aggregate
3/ Back when savings accounts were paying 3 percent interest, a f^c-rite 
mathematical exercise was to calculate the present value of $1 R e s t e d  
in year 1 A.D. at 3 percent interest compounded quarterly. The answer 
is now about $5 5,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,000 ,000 0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0, or slightly 
the present value of the entire Earth plus a few other minor planets 
and a solar system or two. Compounded continuously, one would now have 
about $69,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. Obviously, wealth s 
continually being destroyed as well as created. 0v" . ^ e1“ "‘" ^ ® 8’ 
the growth rate of real wealth probably has not exceeded 1 percent.
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returns,* but also by analysts who compared cash rents with land prices. 5 
Many analysts, however, compared land prices only with the USDA series, 
operators' net farm income," which was relatively stagnant. They thus 
concluded that land prices must have risen for reasons other than income
^ 60s began. USDA's land price specialists found that postwar
stagnant In T , W  r 7  ^  "0perators’ farm income” ™stagnant. In 1963 Gale wrote that although land prices had risen by
42 percent since 1952, annual average net returns to farmers, after
s t ^ h T H r  Kr r ^ rnS t0 lab°r ^  °ther factors> have been relatively stable at about 5 percent of the estimated yearly market value of all
farm real estate, because "of the total net income from farming,
5°£al 5etu5n t0  land bas larger and the total return to
l h?s be?ome waller" (John F. Gale, "What Makes Farm Real 
tfte_PrJces> Agricultural Finance Review. June 1963, pp. 8-17). In 
eech of the next two years, Scofield published an analysis of these 
relationships m  Farm Real Estate Market Developments (FREMD), In the 
65 article, after refining his estimates of residual returns to real 
estate during 1935-64 by imputing a return to management as well as to 
labor and nonreal estate capital, he found that "while total net income 
per acre in 1964 was only 7 percent higher than in 1954...the percentage 
m ^ ? aSe rin per-acre returns [to real estate] has been 58 percent" 
(William H. Scofield,^"Land Prices and Farm Earnings," FREMD, October
1965 pp* 44 5 4) ^  Land Returns and Farm Income," FREMD, August
5/ Scofield (Ibid.) also studied the relationship of land prices to 
cash rents, stating that "cash rents for farms provide a more direct 
measure of the returns realized by landowners than do the imputed
rf ^ rn?* / n 1964 he f°Und that "gross rents...have about kept pace with the rise m  land prices during the last decade," and in 1965 he 
wrote that "rental rates...continued to advance at about the same rate 
as market values, as indicated by the almost constant ratios of gross 
rent to value. In 1973, Reinsel examined longer-term trends in cash 
rents and land values in several states and concluded "that a rather 
close relationship exists between rents and values in the more stable 
agricultural areas of the country” (Robert D. Reinsel, "Land Rents 
Values, and Earnings," paper presented at the meeting of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association, August 1973). In 1981, Dobbins and 
others at Purdue, after examining rents and land prices in one region 
of Indiana during 1960-77, found "no evidence... [of] a statistically 
ferent rate of increase in land returns and land prices" (Craig L. 
Dobbins, et.al., The Return to Land Ownership and Land Values: Is
re ^  RelationshiPr Station Bulletin 311, Purdue University,
February 1981). In the same year, Espel and Robison constructed a 
land-market jnodel In which "cash rents are the major determinants of 
land values (Thomas K. Espel and Lindon J. Robison, A Conversation 
getween Buyers and -Sellers of Land, or, A Market Equilibrium Approach 
tor Estimating Land Values, Agricultural Economics Report 403, Michigan 
State University, December 1981).
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Table 1
Farm income, assets,
and rate of income return
Year
of 1983 dollars 
PCE deflator)
Billions
(using
Income
from
assets
Farm
production
assets
Rate of 
income 
return 
to
assets 
(percent)
1950 * *•
1951 —
1952 —
1953 —
1954.. -
1955.. .
1956.. .
1957..
1958..
1959..
15 
21
16 
8 
6 
9 
9 
8
15
6
1960.. .
1961.. *
1962.. .
1963.. .
1964.. .
1965.. •
1966.. . 
1967. *«
1968.. .
1969.. •
12
13
12
13
9
14
15 
13
10 
13
1970.. .
1971.. .
1972.. .
1973.. .
1974.. .
1975.. . 
197 6 • • ■
1977.. .
1978.. .
1979.. .
12
13
25
55
36
28
16
15
27
30
1980.. .
1981. .  .
1982.. .
1983.. .
15
26
15
21
Source: Appendix,
428
455
464
446
443
451
462
473
501
519
3.6
4.6 
3.4
1.9 
1.3
1.9
1.9 
1.7
2.9
1.2
516
525
540
554
567
590
612
630
638
640
2.3
2.4
2 .1
2.3
1.5
2.4
2.5
2.0
1.5
2.1
636
645
688
768
790
811
892
956
1,032
1,112
1.8
2.0
3.6 
7.1
4.6
3.5
1.8
1.6 
2.6 
2.7
1,130
1,081
1,002
960
1.3
2.4
1.5
2.1
101.1 and 112.1.Tables
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y creased, then aggregate i n ™  *
„  n e g a t e  xncome from assets had also risen
What error were the*,,nese analysts making? in usln(y ••f . s rn using operators’ net
ncome to measure earnings thev
lnrn , 8 ’ th6y Were l00ki"g at the sum of
income from operators' iak
-the, than a . ’ “ > —  ^ h  was stagnant,
, "  “ S ^  ^  h-  rfse, xn eff.ct they
over coked the impact of the ongoing reduction in labor req i
n fj.or1 „ , 1 xa°°* requirements—
ed the -substitution of capita! for labor.- labor _
reduced, more of the "operators’ net farm inc "
capital „ , 6 WaS being earned by
0nly the th-  —  -  earnings of capital-income
from assets— reveal * #-v.£b i
that real i "  ^  Cb-  * indicatestnat real income from asset-* -fe ,
mid-1950 ^  SUbStanUally h^ e r  than in the
Income from as^to
Chart 1 illustrates the two p r o l a t e  factors underlying the
onger-term upward trend that income from assets has shown since the
Great Depression TKa cjsession. The first factor is th* -r
*S the mcrease in sales-rising
real gross income. The second is the
econd is the maintenance of profit margins as
sales rose. Since the mid-1950s t950s, income from assets has tended to
r r “ "  - ,i* “ * * — — w « .
r  » . ,
words, profit margins were mM-nt-t j ^
intained because the decline in labor and
management requirements offset increases in other operatic.
---- - ---- - operating expenses,
6/ Scofield also set the tone
and analysis when, in 1957, he refe“ ed price commentary
land prices rising in the face of ^ / s e e m i n g  Paradox" of
offered a laundry list of possible non* * °F decUning income and
Scofield, "Prevailing LandPMarket Forre^”^  influences (William H.
December 1957, pp. 1500-10). 6S’ Journal of Farm Economy
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Chart 1
Billions of 1983 dollars
Source: Table 112.1
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Real income from assets is plotted again as the solid curve in 
Chart 2. On the scale used for income in this chart, the growth of 
earnings during the period from 1954 to 1971 is more clearly visible 
than it was in Chart 1. During this period, the annual growth rate of 
real income from assets averaged 3 percent; that is, the rate of increase 
in nominal income from assets was about 3 percentage points above the 
general inflation rate. Note, however, that this respectable record of 
real growth was later dwarfed by the earnings explosion of the 1970s.
Income-asset relationships
Chart 2 is designed for study of the response of farm asset values 
to changes in the earnings of those assets. Because farm land was 
valued at a much lower average multiple of earnings before the 1950s, 
the value of farm assets is plotted twice. The first plot is the 
long-dash curve using Scale A, which is set at 25 times the scale for 
income; thus, when this asset curve and the income curve are at the 
same level, farm assets are valued at 25 times earnings. As shown, 
this was approximately the average price-earnings ratio from 1910 
through 1952. Therefore, as the lower panel indicates, the rate of 
income return to assets fluctuated around an average of about 4 percent 
during that period.
Assets are plotted a second time as the short-dash curve using 
Scale B, which is set at 50 times the scale for income. Note that this 
was approximately the average price-earnings ratio over the last thirty 
years. During this period, therefore, the rate of income return to 
assets averaged about 2 percent.
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Chart 2
Assets
Billions of 1983 dollars
Source: Tables 101.1 and 112.1
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FARM WEALTH M D  PUBLIC POLICY
Chart 2 indicated two distinct periods of growth in farm wealth 
since the Korean War: 1954-71 and 1972-79. Table 2 shows the annual
capital gains in these periods, as well as their total in each cyclical 
swing. The data in this table are, in billions of 1983 dollars, the 
amounts by which the increase in the value of farm production real 
estate exceeded the sum of net real estate improvements plus the capital 
appreciation needed to keep pace with general price inflation. This 
remaining portion of capital appreciation— the capital appreciation in 
excess of net investment and general inflation— is called real capital 
gains. It has been the main component of growth in real farm wealth, 
greatly exceeding the contribution of net investment.
Policy and the growth of wealth: the 1960s
In the 1960s the government was operating, and thus consumers and 
taxpayers were supporting, programs intended to improve farm income.
To many observers, however, these programs appeared to be relatively 
ineffective, because operators' net farm income" was stagnant and the 
rate of income return to equity remained relatively low. As already 
noted, however, real income from assets and real land prices were in 
reality both rising gradually; hence, real income and wealth were both 
improving. Thus agricultural real estate was exhibiting, to a moderate 
degree, the classic characteristics of a growth stock: (a) the real
income it produced was rising; therefore, (b) its value was rising in 
proportion; and (c) its rate of income return was relatively low because 
its value reflected expectations that the income would continue rising.
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Table 2
Real capital gains on 
(Billions
farm real estate (excluding operators' dwellings) 
of 1983 dollars, using PCE deflator)
1952..... -3
1953..... -8
1954 ••••*• 10
1955 11
1956..... 14
1957•***•• 8
1958 •*•••• 21
1959..... 8
1960 -3
1961..... 12
1962 »»»•»■ 8
1963...... 15
1964..... 17
1965..... 18
1966 ****** 10
19 67 #«•«*> 11
1968..... 2
1969..... -8
1970..... -1
1971*#*®** 18
1972..... 40
1973..... 72
1974..... * 30
1975...»•« 61
1976..... 90
1977 ...... 42
1978...... 69
1979..... 42
1980..... -3
1981..... -64
1982..... -78
1983..... -3
Cyclical summary:
1952-53... -11
1954-59... 72
1960..... -3
1961-68... 93
1969-70... -9
1971-79... 465
1980-83... -149
Source: Appendix, Table 312.1
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In this period, it appears that public farm policy contributed 
significantly to establishing the conditions that fostered growth in 
income from assets, and hence growth in asset values. Farm productivity 
was rising sharply, reducing unit costs of production. Thus unit sale 
prices of farm products would also have tended to fall, but such declines 
were slowed or prevented by government price support programs. The 
combination of falling unit costs and steadier unit sale prices resulted 
in rising income frQm assets, and hence in rising land prices»^
In establishing programs that would increase farm income, 
policymakers appeared to believe that the rate of return to farm assets 
would also increase. But this could not be the outcome, once enough time 
had elapsed for the land market to react to the change in income* As 
already noted (footnote 2 ), programs cannot alter the total rate of 
return,® which is set by farmers themselves in the land market• However, 
by instituting programs that helped to establish a rising trend in real 
current income from farm assets, government actions did alter the 
relative composition of the total return* Because the asset market 
recognized that income was growing, the rising total return consisted 
of real capital gains as well as the rising current income.
U  Chryst presented a theoretical argument for this joint effect of 
technological advance and price supports, and Herdt and Cochrane 
successfully used the effect to explain changes in land prices, although 
they had an incorrect conception of how it operated (fn. 9). (Walter 
E. Chryst, "Land Values and Agricultural Income: A Paradox?" Journal of 
Farm Economics, December 1965, pp. 1265-73; Robert W. Herdt and 
Willard W. Cochrane, "Farm Land Prices and Farm Technological Advance," 
Journal of Farm Economics, May 1966, pp. 243-63.)
8/ Assuming, as usual, "other things equal," including risk. But if 
government programs, by tending to stabilize income, also reduce risk, 
participants in the land market would probably regard this as a favorable 
development, and would set a lower total rate of return— another logical 
result (it may seem paradoxical, but is not) that may disappoint some 
advocates of the programs.
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From 1961 through 1968, as shown in the summary in Table 2, real 
capital gains on farm real estate (excluding operators' dwellings), in 
1983 dollars, totaled §93 billion. Increased real income led to this
result_the rise in asset values resulted from and was roughly
proportional to the rise in income. Proportional increases in income 
and in asset values meant that the rate of income return to assets did
not change.
Very likely, policymakers would have preferred a different outcome. 
The unchanged low rate of income return enabled farmers to claim that 
farming was as "unprofitable" as ever, and continued to make things 
very difficult for beginning farmers and others who needed a higher 
income return to cover basic family living expenses. Suppose, however, 
that the farm policy goal of the 1960s is restated. Instead of seeking 
to raise the rate of return— which could not be done because it is 
determined in the land market— consider the more limited, but feasible, 
goal of raising the income of persons who are already the owners of 
farm assets. This goal was accomplished. Their income was raised, 
at a cost in part of less food at higher prices, borne by consumers 
worldwide, and in part of government outlays, borne by U.S. taxpayers.
As just described, increased earnings for farm owners necessarily 
increased their wealth as well, because assets which produce more 
income have greater value. Very roughly, during the 1960s the identical 
farm that had been worth $200,000 producing annual asset earnings of 
$4,000 became, in constant dollars, a $250,000 farm producing $5,000.
The commensurate increase in farm wealth was an integral and unavoidable 
part of the process that raised farm earnings and living levels. Thus 
it is nonsense to lament the capitalization of income gains. At best,
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that complaint mistakenly implies that capitalization was either 
unexpected or avoidable; at worst, it mistakenly implies that the 
income gains were negated by the higher "cost" of farm assets. 9
What consequences does a rise in real farm wealth have for future 
years, for future generations of consumers? To be preserved, the added 
wealth demands in future years a return that is large enough, on average 
to provide a rate of return equal to the required rate of return then 
prevailing among buyers and sellers of farms. If, for example, the 
required rate of return is 5 percent, then nearly $5 billion per year 
in additional income from assets (in 1983 dollars) is required to 
preserve the real wealth gain of the 1960s. Such additional income 
that preserves the added wealth must be provided by purchasers of food. 
If, m  some future period, commodity markets fail to produce such
1/ Greater farm wealth is an added "cost” for future buyers of farms 
but not for present owners and their heirs. While both present owners 
and future buyers receive the higher income flowing to the greater 
wealth, the future buyers will have paid more for the asset. 
Unfortunately, it appears that some observers who lamented the 
capitalization of farm program benefits had made a horrendous analytical 
error: upon seeing that "operators* net farm income" was flat while
land values were rising, they mistakenly concluded that capitalization 
had somehow vaporized the underlying income gains. Brun exemplified 
that deluslion most explicitly when he wrote that "...farmers will be 
prospective buyers of additional land in the hope of an increasing 
income per hectare, but...due to the competition on the land market, 
they will never succeed in achieving this increase of income. ...The 
simultaneous occurrence of new techniques and of price supports is 
sufficient to provoke a rising trend in land values without an increase 
of the net income per acre" (Andre Brun, "The development of agricultural 
prices and ownership," European Review of Agricultural Economics.
Volume 1-3, 1973, pp. 258-259). Brun made these observations in-----
reporting the findings of Herdt and Cochrane (op. cit.t fn. 7) who 
had a faulty conception of the capitalization process and thus*did not 
appreciate that, in explaining why land prices were rising, they had 
also explained why land income and rents were increasing. Instead 
seemingly unaware of Scofield's work (fn. 4 and 5), and knowing that 
net farm income was not rising, they were convinced that they were 
dealing only with income gains that were merely "expected" increases 
which vanished when capitalized.
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income, the wealth is jeopardized. Its owners may then look to government 
programs— which helped to create this wealth— for help in preserving it.
Policy and the growth of wealth: the 1970s
While the increase in farm wealth prior to the 1970s may be viewed 
as part of the process by which farm living levels were deliberately 
raised toward comparability with average urban levels, no such benign 
attitude appears appropriate toward the events and results of the 1970s.
Initially, enormous gains in earnings of crop producers resulted from 
market forces propelled by foreign droughts and the U.S. drought of 
1974, a drop in the exchange value of the dollar, and rising incomes 
around the world. Land prices responded both to ongoing gains m  
profitability and to strong expectations of continued future gains.
As Table 2 shows, from 1971 through 1979 real capital gains on 
farm production real estate, in 1983 dollars, totaled $465 billion.
If considered as distributed among 2.4 million farms, wealth rose by 
an average of $200,000. More realistically, much of the gain occurred 
on less than 1 million farms, on which the average gain was perhaps 
$400,000. If the required rate of return is 5 percent, $23 billion 
in additional annual income from assets (in 1983 dollars) would be 
required to preserve this mammoth increase in real wealth. Here, in 
truth, was created a monster to be fed in each suceeding year by buyers
of food.
If the greater earnings that triggered farm wealth creation m  the
1970s arose mainly from a permanently tighter worldwide supply-demand
relationship for food— a result, perhaps, of greater demand colliding 
with inherently greater difficulty in increasing supply— then the 
annual earnings required to sustain the increased wealth would continue
18
to be provided by purchasers of food through the routine operation of 
commodity markets. Persons who owned farm assets in the 1970s 
appropriately could continue to be congratulated on their foresight or 
good fortune in selection of investment or occupation.
If, however, the gains in earnings and wealth resulted in large 
part from events that turned out to be temporary— which may be the case 
if supply-demand conditions experienced so far in the 1980s prove 
representative of future norms— then those gains also should be in 
large part temporary. In this case, therefore, pleas for public 
programs to restore earnings nearer to their boom levels should be 
resisted. Otherwise, we would have a truly astonishing result: a 
couple of droughts in Russia create a very large new wealthy class in 
the United States, and its wealth is henceforth sustained indefinitely 
by public programs that either produce higher food prices than otherwise 
would have prevailed or, through an assortment of mechanisms, transfer 
public funds to farmers.
Policy and falling wealth: the 1980s
During 1980-83, real capital losses on farm production real estate, 
in 1983 dollars, totaled $149 billion. Thus the size of the monster
remaining as a legacy of the 1970s has been reduced by one-third, to
about $300 billion.
As their new wealth has been threatened by lower earnings, owners 
of farm assets have strived in various ways to preserve their gains, 
including the instigation of public programs toward that end. One 
cannot fault the owners of these assets for making such efforts. But the 
public and its policymakers need not succumb to their entreaties. For 
instance, appeals to the sympathies and sensibilities of the public are
- 19 -
Chart 3
RATES OF RETURN TO FARM ASSETS AND EQUITY
Percent
Source: Table 101.1
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legitimate tactics, but policymakers who understand the underlying 
financial processes may find that the broader public interest is served 
by resisting many such pleas* For guidance in these matters, 
policymakers, the media, and the public look to analysts in government 
and at agricultural colleges; unfortunately, a goodly number of these 
analysts need to update their own understanding and interpretation of 
financial processes and events in agriculture.
In retrospect, the scope of post—boom financial problems might have 
been reduced by a firmer farm policy stance in the mid-1970s. Over 
half of the real capital gains of that decade— $243 billion of the $465 
billion arose in 1976—79. President Ford and his advisers were on the 
right track in 1975, when he vetoed a bill that would have raised farm 
price support levels substantially. If this policy stance had been 
maintained, further land price advances might have been restrained by 
the specter of more pronounced valleys in commodity price cycles. But 
the Ford administration later raised price supports just before the 
1976 election. Having promised higher supports during his campaign, 
President Carter soon raised them again. Land prices continued to 
escalate and by 1979 they fully capitalized both a level of income that 
was not to be sustained in following years and expectations of income 
growth that were not to be fulfilled. If the rise in land prices had 
been moderated by allowing farm prices and income to drop lower in the 
mid-1970s, there might now be less financial trauma among farmers.^
12/ As is typical, post-boom financial stress has been concentrated 
among farmers who incurred relatively heavy debt during the final 
stages of the boom. In this post—boom period, however, the relative 
size of this group and the magnitude of its problems have been greatly 
increased by a huge rise in interest rates. Problems of indebted 
farmers and the condition of rural banks are discussed in a forthcoming 
article, "A Financial Perspective on Agriculture," in the January 1984 
issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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Meanwhile, as Chart 2 vividly indicated, far™ land still appears 
to carry the price-earnings multiple of a growth .to*. This teens 
that pressures to achieve earnings growth retain, and that a fundatental 
readjustment of land values awaits at the eventual end of earnings 
growth. At some point-which could he at hand or might not occur for 
decades-the long-term uptrend in earnings inevitably will end. 
farmers become aware and convinced of its probable demise, farm land 
wlll be revalued to produce a higher rate of income return. This will 
heIp with some farm problems, such as the need of beginning farmers for
only way to get from a low to a higher rate of income return is through
a drop in real asset values, further financial difficulties can be
, while it is possible that this periodexpected during this process. While it i p
has arrived, recent experience can still prove to have been just an 
unusually prolonged cyclical downturn in a continuing longer-term
uptrend-
in summary, what is the message of the foregoing financial analysis
for public policy? From the viewpoint of the general public interest 
rather than from that of the special interest of present owners of 
farms, the analysis provides little support for public programs that  ^
would, by using public funds to replace farm income no longer forthcoming 
from commodity markets, perpetuate the wealth created during 
farm boom. If a lower level of earnings continues to be the
long-term supply-demand relationships, policymakers and the public 
should not feel bad, as they now often seem to, about putting limits on
public aid to the farm sector.
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a p p e n d i x
Sources of data
Data used in this paper are for the farm sector excluding 
farm households; that is, the data exclude operators' dwellings, 
household equipment and furnishings, and all financial assets 
except currency, bank demand deposits, and stock
cooperatives. The data used are primarily USDA series published
In Economix__lndicators_j>f_the_J[arm__SectorJ__Income_jind_Balance_
c ^ t  Statistics, 1982, ERS ECIFS 2-2, October 1983, adjusted for 
T ^ ^ T I T ^ r ^  below. Farm income and expense data for 
1983 and farm asset and debt data for January 1, 1984 are 
primarily midpoints of USDA projections published in the August 
and September 1983 issues of ^ r i c u l t u r a L O u t l ^  and additional 
estimates consistent with these projections. Asset and debt data 
for 1910-1939 are based on series published by Alvin S. Tost 
in 1.1 in Agriculture: Its Formation and_FinancinS_jince
1870, Princeton University Press, 1957, and series in Historical 
ct,MSties of the United States, Oolonial Times to 1970, U.S. 
n . . r»f the Census, 1975,
Adjustment for price level changes
Data adjusted for changes in the general level of prices are
shown in dollars of 1983 purchasing power, using the implicit
price deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The 
PCE deflator is also used in calculating real capital gains. 
Deflator values for the second half of 1983 and for January 1, 
1984 are estimated. Deflator values for January 1 are estimated
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as the average for the two adjoining quarters (for 1929-1945, the 
two adjoining years). For years before 1929, the deflator used is 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) adjusted to the level of the PCE 
deflator in 1929.
As an indicator of the impact of price changes on farm family 
living expenditures, the PCE deflator is superior to the CPI, which 
has fixed weights and also has overstated the rate of inflation 
faced by most households during periods of rising interest rates. 
The PCE deflator is also superior to the GNP deflator, to which 
many agricultural economists have resorted, because the latter 
includes such irrelevant and potentially troublesome components as 
the prices of military hardware and business plant and equipment 
and the salaries of federal civilian and military employees.
Derivation of "income from assets"
Income from assets measures the net income produced by farm 
assets, regardless of their ownership and method of financing.
Thus, payments of rent and Interest are not subtracted when such 
income is computed; on the other hand, income attributable to the 
labor and management work of farm operators and their families 
must be estimated and subtracted.
The derivation of income from assets is shown in Table 112.1. 
The computation starts with gross farm income, from which 
nonfactor operating expenses are subtracted to obtain cash flow 
from the factors of production (labor, management, and assets).
Next, estimated capital consumption— depreciation and accidental 
damage of assets is subtracted to obtain net income from the 
factors. When payments to hired labor are also subtracted, the
25
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result is the net income of operators and landlords from their 
farm assets, labor, and management (not shown in Table 112.1, but 
plotted in Chart 1).
The final step in derivation of income from assets is to 
estimate and subtract the imputed value of labor and management 
work performed by farm operators and unpaid family workers; that 
is, the income these persons would have received for their work if 
they had been paid the wage rates and fees that farm laborers and 
management firms received for such services. Because published 
USDA estimates of such imputed labor income are substantially 
understated, an intermim series estimated by the author is shown 
in Table 112.1 and used in this paper. The need for and estimation 
of the interim series are discussed in a later section.
Derivation of total returns from assets and equity
"Total return from assets" is the sum of income from assets 
plus real capital gains on assets. Because the price of farm 
assets has reflected expectations of future income growth and 
hence real capital gains, those gains must be included in 
computations of the return that the assets have produced for 
their buyers and owners. The derivation of real capital gains is 
described in the last section of this appendix.
"Total return from equity" is total return from assets less 
interest paid, plus real capital gains on debt; that is, total 
return from assets less the real cost of borrowed funds.
Note that "income return from equity," featured in USDA 
presentations of returns, is not shown in this paper. To obtain 
that series, all of the interest paid is subtracted from the
27
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income from assets, ignoring reai capital gains on both assets and 
debt. As noted by Hottel and Gardner, when borrowed funds are used 
to finance assets that are expected to produce both income and 
capital gains, it is misleading to charge all of the interest 
against the income return and thus exaggerate the relative importance 
of capital gains in the total return.H. 0n the other hand, the 
capital gains are a relatively illiquid form of return, except as 
they may support additional borrowing; thus, in computing the flow
of spendable funds, it is appropriate to subtract interest from 
cash flow, as is done in Table 122.1.
Imputed value of operators* labor
Estimates shown for returns to assets and equity differ from 
those in ECIFS because a different procedure was used to estimate 
the imputed value of labor provided by operators and unpaid 
family workers, shown in Table 112.1. In the USDA procedure, 
this series is obtained by subtracting expenditures for hired 
labor from the product of manhours required in farm production 
times the hired labor wage rate. While conceptually sound, this 
procedure yields increasingly flawed results in recent years, 
understating the imputed value mainly because the manhours are 
understated, and perhaps also because expenditures for hired labor 
are overstated. The flaw is revealed by comparing the implied 
percentage of total farm work performed by hired labor with other 
6StlmateS °f thlS ratl°- ^  th°“Sh the latter estimates are not
^1/ J. Bruce Hottel and Bruce L. Gardner "The Rare of ,,,
Investment in Agriculture and Measuring Net Farm Tncn ? e ‘ u rn . t0Journal of April-,,i rnrni Frrmnmi * S farm Income, American — ------ ^ftgncu-Ltural Economics. August 1983, pp. 553-55T.-----
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thought to be highly r e H aM «  -u
* he comparison nevertheless provides
convincing evidence that imputed operators, iahor has been
increasingly understated:
by hired i . w
Implied by USDA imputation procedure.., 
Manhours series, USDA,......
Manhours series, BLS household survey.. 
Employment series, USDA............
Employment series, BLS household survey
1960 1970 1980 1982
32 44 66 73
23 24 35 32
26 26 33 35
27 26 35 35
29 30 36 38
As an interim measure pending the indicated revision of the 
USDA estimates, imputed operators' labor in Table 112.1 
“ “ “ “  " “ " S ■*
*“  ,lS ,«rl„ 09*7-83),
adjusted (arbitrarily, by 10 percent f
7 percent) ^ r  probable overreporting
of employment and hours ofours of operators and unpaid family workers.
The difference between this interim series and thelies and the present USDA
series is substantial in recent years sea .u .years, and the income return to
assets is correspondingly lower than the USDA estimate: 
^ g P g ^ o n _ o f J J SDA and interim
___Billions of dollars
Hired labor, USDA series.....
1960 1970 1980 1982
Imputed operators 1 
USDA series...,
labor:
^ * 3 10.3 12 .1
Interim series. 5.3 5.4 4.5
Income from assets 
USDA series....
:
11.3 18.7 20.4
Interim series^. 11.0 26.1 30.5
5,0 12.7 14.7
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Ongoing USDA work on measures of farm employment includes 
expanded survey efforts that appear certain to produce improved 
data for use in estimating returns. The series in question are 
receiving serious attention from the USDA research staff, in part 
because they also have considerable significance in other calculations
of farm income and productivity.
Readers who recall the article on returns recently published 
by Hottel and Gardner will note that the interim series used here 
copes with the problem of understated labor requirements that they 
noted.12 However, it is apparent that they were not aware of the 
full extent to which the understated data and the computational 
procedure were in combination producing a progressively and 
dramatically increasing error, so bad that a negative value might 
soon be produced for operators' imputed labor! It appears that no 
one realized the seriousness of this problem until I happened to 
place the USDA hired labor and imputed operators' labor series in 
adjacent columns of Table 112.1, which called attention to their 
unrealistic divergence.
Hottel and Gardner also discussed results that would have been 
obtained if farm operators’ labor were valued at an "opportunity 
cost” such as the average manufacturing wage rate, rather than the 
farm wage rate. This concept has other analytical uses but would 
be wrong in the calculation of returns to assets, for which one 
needs the wage at which owners of assets can hire farm labor and 
managers— not the wage in factory work, agricultural economics, or 
other jobs that farm operators could handle. In other words, when
12/ Ibid.
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farm owners are hiring managers and laborers, offering them the 
going fees and wages, it is irrelevant that the applicants may have 
had other opportunities. However, if labor markets are reasonably 
efficient, the going fees and wages for farm work already reflect 
those opportunity costs that are in fact relevant.
Derivation of real capital gains
Real capital gain (loss) on farm assets is the amount by 
which the annual increase in total market value of assets is 
greater (less) than the sum of net investment and of the change in 
general purchasing power of the total funds tied up in these 
assets. Real capital gain (loss) on debt is the decrease 
(increase) in general purchasing power of the funds owed. Changes 
in general purchasing power are measured by the PCE deflator.
The estimates shown in Tables 112.1 and 312.1 thus differ from 
those of the USDA, which uses the Consumer Price Index in these
computations and has published its estimates in current dollars 
only*
Updated data
Beginning with* the June 1984 issue, data series shown in this 
appendix will be updated and published in the quarterly Agricultural 
Finance Databook, Statistical Release E.15, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. A mailing list for this periodical is 
maintained by Publications Services, Stop 138, Federal Reserve Board, 
Washington, D.C. 20551.
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